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Effective and timely evacuation is critical in alleviating the impact of hurricanes. As such, evacuation models are often
sought to support the preparedness of evacuations. One important task in the modeling process is to evaluate exogenous
factors that cause transportation system capacity loss during evacuation. Typical factors include direct damage to the
roadway network due to storm surge and cascading impacts because of other facilities failures. For example, power outage
can lead to signal failure and subway suspension. *is paper aims to develop a macroscopic simulation-based approach to
study the capacity loss of the roadway network in evacuation due to signal loss as a consequence of power outage. In
particular, to simulate the case in which traffic signals lose power, a capacity-reduction model from signalized inter-
sections to unsignalized (all-way stop control) intersections was developed and calibrated using microscopic model
created in SUMO and Synchro. We used the downtown Manhattan as a case study area and created a hypothetical power-
grid network in terms of neighborhoods. Six scenarios were built to simulate power loss of different neighborhoods. *e
simulation results give insights on how cascading failures of power network affect roadway network and
evacuation process.
1. Introduction
One of the most challenging issues in prehurricane evacu-
ation planning is the uncertainties of the actual conditions
that may cause roadway capacity loss and additional delays.
So, evaluating such uncertainties is critical for emergency
planning and management and, to some extent, to alleviate
negative impacts of hurricanes. Road network degradation
can be attributable to either endogenous or exogenous
reasons. Endogenous risks refer to uncertainties of the
transportation system supply, as discussed in Li and Ozbay
[1], while exogenous risks are due to external impacts,
specifically, incident-induced capacity loss during the
evacuation operations. According to real-world incident
data collected during evacuation before the landfall of
Hurricane Sandy, there are five types of incidents that have a
direct impact on the highway network: accident, debris,
disabled vehicle, downed trees, and flooding [2, 3]. Apart
from direct impact of storm surge on the transportation
network, hurricanes also bring disruptions to other city
infrastructures, such as power and communication systems.
Unlike accidents or flooding that directly results in lane/road
blockages, these infrastructures do not direct impact on the
evacuation routes. Instead, the strong wind and rain fall
before hurricane landfall could result in downed trees and
other incident that cause failure of power infrastructure and
then cause cascading failures of the transportation systems.
For example, massive power outages caused by hurricanes
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may take out traffic signals and result in gridlocks at the
signalized intersections. Failure of the power system can also
affect other transportation systems (e.g., subways) that
heavily rely on power supply.
Existing research has made great efforts in modeling the
impact of endogenous risks associated with transportation
system planning in evacuation [1]. However, there was still
limited progress in probing the impact of the exogenous
risks. As such, this paper contributes to the literature by
making some attempts in this perspective. Specifically, it
aims to model the cascading failures of power networks
during storm surge. In particular, it considered downtown
Manhattan that has experienced severe cascading failures of
infrastructure systems during Hurricane Sandy as the study
area. Considering the limited availability of power-grid data,
a hypothetical power network using urban neighborhoods as
the fundamental units is constructed. Each neighborhood is
denoted as a node, and hypothetical links are used to connect
these nodes based on an adjacency matrix. A simulation-
based approach is then developed to analyze different sce-
narios of traffic signal control system failures as a result of
the power loss.*is facilitates the evaluation of the cascading
impact on evacuation performance and transportation
system resiliency.
1.1. Literature Reviews. In recent years, cascading failures of
various infrastructures have drawn increased attention of
researchers. Fotouhi et al. [4] quantified the resilience of the
urban traffic-electric power coupled system using mixed-
integer program to address the interdependencies between
urban traffic and power distribution systems. *eir study
provides an alternative perspective of power to evaluate the
lifeline performance. Zhang et al. [5] proposed a cascading
failure model of public transit network to evaluate station
frequency density under deliberate attack of traffic signals.
*ey built simulation experiments using Jinan in China as a
background city to verify the feasibility of their model. *eir
results reveal that by optimizing the station intensity and bus
lanes, cascading survivability of public transit network can
be improved. Oricchio et al. [6] explored the signal oper-
ations in flash mode due to power loss. *e key findings of
their study show that flashing modes provide reasonable
performance with lower demand but cause breakdowns at
higher volumes.
Regardless of hurricane impact, a number of studies
focus on methods to estimate the capacity of unsignalized
intersections. Wegmann [7] proposed a methodology to
estimate the capacity of unsignalized intersections using gap
distributions and bunching of major road traffic, with
nonhomogeneous and inconsistent behavior of minor road
traffic. Baass [8] pointed out that a number of vehicles that
can cross an intersection depend on two factors: number of
acceptable gaps and gap-acceptance distributions. Brilon
and Miltner [9] discussed the conflicts of stop-control in-
tersections and proposed the “Conflict Technique” to
quantify the capacity loss for the unsignalized intersections.
Prasetijo et al. [10] developed a regression method to
measure unsignalized capacity based on the conflicting
streams with distinct average speed and flow assigned to
each stream. *e estimated values were validated by em-
pirical data from Indonesia. Another methodology based on
evaluating expected average delays at multimodal uncon-
trolled intersections was presented in [11], which can rep-
resent the overall magnitude of capacity and delay. However,
most of the previous research regarding capacity mea-
surements of stop-controlled intersections is based on mi-
croscopic scenarios. Very few studies have considered the
capacity loss under hurricane scenarios [2]. To utilize
macroscopic planning model to quantify capacity reduction
under signal failures, a new and more generalized approach
is needed.
1.2. Data and Modeling Tools. *e network model is based
on the second generation of New York Best Practice
(NYBPM 2G) [12] network. It is a widely used macroscopic
planning model based on TransCAD 6.0 [13]. *e NYBPM
network is a generalization of the street network of New
York City (NYC) metropolitan area that can be regarded as a
directed graph. *e intersections and roadways between
intersections are represented by nodes and links of the
graph, respectively. Each link also has attributes, such as
from-node, to-node, direction (s), number of lanes per
direction, functional class (fclass [14] and codes shown in
Table 1), and original capacity. *ere is no attribute for
nodes, but their attributes can be retrieved by adjacent links
and combined with other spatial data. *e nodes and links
do not completely overlap with (but close to) actual roads
and intersections, and some of local streets are replaced by
centroid connectors. Most of major streets, especially for
Manhattan, are kept in the model.
*e limitation of this network is that there is no in-
formation on whether an intersection is signalized or not. To
solve this issue, OpenStreetMap (OSM) [15] data are used.
*e OSM data contain the information of signalized in-
tersections, such as signal post location and base signal
timings. *ese attributes can provide the signalization in-
formation of all the intersections in the studied network.
To estimate and calibrate the intersection capacity
under the power-loss scenario, two distinct microscopic
simulation tools, namely, Behrisch [16] and Husch [17], are
utilized. SUMO is a robust microsimulation tool that
gained popularity in recent years, due to the flexibility of
scenario settings, including detailed capabilities of simu-
lation of signalized and unsignalized intersections. Synchro
is a traditional microscopic simulation tool which is widely
used in the US. Synchro includes a powerful signal-timing
optimization tool and HCM 2010 [18] support, which can
be applied to measure the performance of intersections
under varied control scenarios. Particularly, the unsign-
alized intersection delay model was included in the tool, as
mentioned in Chapter 19 and 20 of HCM 2010. Both
simulation tools can estimate the capacity reduction due to
the transition from signalized to unsignalized control, by
measuring saturation flow rates under two circumstances
where their level of services (LOS) are assumed to be
equivalent.
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2. Methodology
*is main objective of this paper is to build and test an
evacuation scenario under the cascading failures of power
and signalized intersection networks. *e lower Manhattan
in New York City is selected as the study area. Before and
after the land fall of Hurricane Sandy, the study area suffered
from significant power-loss and signal failures that lasted for
a couple of days.
Typically, malfunction of traffic signals caused by power
outage shows flashing red lights for several hours using their
backup power and then becomes dark if the outage lasts
longer. In the United States, a flashing red is equivalent to
all-way stop control (AWSC) [18]. *erefore, this study
assumes that the control type of intersections converts from
signalized to AWSC when they lose power, which is the
needed safety action when traffic signals encounter outage.
In the macroscopic model, the effect of the switch from a
signalized to an unsignalized intersection can be measured
by calculating the difference between the capacity of a
signalized capacity and the capacity of AWSC. So, the core of
this modeling methodology is how to quantify the loss of
intersection capacity as a result of power outage.
*ere are some important challenges. Firstly, in typical
modeling of AWSC intersections, input like turning
movements or turning rates are known. However, they are
absent in the data used in this study. Secondly, the signal
timing of the NYBPM model is considered through the
reduction of intersection capacity and cannot be extracted
separately. *us, it is not possible to build a relationship
between existing signalized and unsignalized intersection
capacities. Considering intersection types, directions, and
number of lanes, there are more than a hundred combi-
nations of intersection structures in the study area, including
four-way and T (or Y) intersections. A number of lanes for
each direction range from 0 (one-way street) to 5. HCM 2010
provides a method to calculate the capacity of the AWSC
intersections. However, such method does not include the
cases in which the number of lanes per direction exceeds two
(such case satisfies the warrants of signalized intersection).
*e same limitation also applies to Synchro. SUMO, how-
ever, can simulate unsignalized scenarios with more than
two lanes, but its capacity is related to a number of vehicular
parameters such as gap acceptance and driver aggressive-
ness. *ese values can be adjusted to identify capacity values
that are in agreement with the Synchro output.
By considering aforementioned difficulties, a generalized
solution based on microsimulation models of selected
typical intersections can be built. Both in Synchro and
SUMO, intersections with no more than three lanes per
direction are created. *e capacity value obtained from
SUMO is calibrated using Synchro results. For intersections
with more than three lanes, capacity is calculated based on
SUMO’s estimations. Finally, the capacity along with at-
tributes of selected intersections is used to build a predictive
model of unsignalized capacity.
Following sections describe the modeling approach in
detail. Firstly, the data for modeling and prediction are
filtered and processed. *en, capacity-loss models are
constructed based on results from microscopic simulation
models. Lastly, the model is used to predict capacity loss for
all signalized intersections and update the simulation
network.
2.1. Data Filtering and Processing. As mentioned above,
there are no attributes for nodes, so spatial attributes, such as
neighborhood tabulation area (NTA) that intersection be-
longs to, are assigned to the nodes. Besides, attributes of
connected links can also be found by using a lookup table of
links. *is step constructs a data table of nodes that contains
information about connected links such as name of the
streets, number of lanes, and capacity for each direction.
*e following step is used to filter the nodes that cor-
respond to signalized intersections out of all nodes. *is
approach contains two operations: check if the node is
actually an intersection (not expressway interchange or
ramp), and if they are close to traffic signals.*is can be done
as follows: if all the links connect to the node belong to an
expressway (whose fclass is 11 or 12), the node is not an
intersection. If the node is confirmed as an intersection, the
distance from each node to the location of nearest traffic
light is measured, which is obtained from OSM data. If the
distance is lower than certain value, the node is identified as
signalized. In this study, 220 feet is selected as the filtering
threshold. *e filtered signalized intersection is shown in
green dots in Figure 1.
Another task for data processing is to determine the
number of conflicts for each intersection. According to
HCM 2010, when the intersection is operating as AWSC, the
capacity of approach is related to conflicting approaches, as
shown in Figure 2. If traffic is present in the study approach
only (Case 1), subject vehicles depart as rapidly as individual
drivers can safely accelerate and clear the intersection. If one
or more vehicles present in opposing approaches (Cases 2 to
5), subject vehicles have to yield to other approaches to make
Table 1: Functional class codes [14].
Type Urban code Rural code Code for modeling
Principal arterial-interstate 11 01 1
Principal arterial-other freeway/expressway 12 02 2
Principal arterial-other 14 04 3
Minor arterial 16 06 4
Major collector 17 07 5
Minor collector 18 08 6
Local 19 09 7
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sure that only one vehicle can pass the intersection at the
same time. It can be implied that the throughput of AWSC
intersection is directly related to number of opposing ap-
proaches or number of conflicts, which can be calculated
from intersection attributes. For example, if there are four
links connected to a node A and three links have lanes
towards A, the number of conflicts for node A is 2. For Tand
four-way intersections, the maximum numbers of conflicts
are 2 and 3, respectively. Please refer to Figure 3 for different
types of conflicts.*e data filtering and processing algorithm
is summarized in Figure 4.
2.2. Modeling of Intersection Capacity Loss. As mentioned
above, Synchro and SUMO are used to calculate and calibrate
the unsignalized intersection capacity loss. Five intersections
Figure 1: Filtered signalized intersections.
Case 1: vehicle (s) on
subject approach only
Case 4: vehicles on subject
and two other approaches
Case 5: vehicles on all approaches
Case 2: vehicles on subject
and opposing approaches
Case 3: vehicles on subject
and conflicting approaches
Figure 2: Description of opposing approaches.
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located in lower Manhattan are selected as the examples. *e
attributes of selected intersections are shown in Table 2.
In the first step, Synchro models are used to measure the
capacity of intersections based on default parameters defined
in HCM 2010. Taking Synchro capacity as a benchmark,
multiple simulation runs are made in SUMO. In each run,
crucial behavioral parameters such as gap acceptance and
acceleration rates are adjusted so that the output saturation
flow rate approaches the Synchro capacity. Table 3 shows
calibrated SUMO output based on Synchro capacity.
Based on the calibrated SUMO model, capacity of other
intersections is simulated. Output capacity of intersections is
illustrated in Table 4, along with attributes of the links.
It is observed that the capacity shows strong linear
correlation with the attributes of intersections. *us, they
were applied to all the intersections of the similar types in the
studied network.
2.3. PredictionandAssignment ofCapacityLoss. *e last step
of this methodology is to estimate the capacity loss, by
reducing the capacity to the unsignalized level for all
signalized intersections in the designated area. *is is
implemented by using the lookup table for all intersections
within the cascading failure zones, and we predict the
capacity loss for each relevant link. It should be noted that
Conflict




Figure 3: Conflict numbers and types.
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the lower bound of reduced capacity (if original capacity is
greater than 0) is set to 100 rather than 0.*e reason for this
assumption is for computational needs that allow iterations
of traffic assignment to reach convergence eventually.
Finally, capacity-loss table for each scenario is built and fed
into the evacuation assignment model. *e procedure
adopted in this step is summarized as a pseudocode shown
in Figure 5.
Figure 4: Pseudocodes of data filtering and processing.
Table 2: Selected intersections and attributes.
Intersection Approaches Lanes Conflicts




Center Street and Hester Street Center NB 3 1Hester WB 1
Lafayette Street and Walker Street Lafayette SB 2 1Walker EB 1
Broadway and Franklin Street Broadway SB 2 1Franklin EB 1
Church Street and Walker Street Church NB 3 1Walker EB 1
Table 3: Calibration results of selected intersection.
Intersection Approaches Synchro SUMO Delay (s) V/C ratio
Broadway and Franklin Street
Broadway (T) 804 893 44.7 0.98Broadway (L) 89
Franklin (T) 416 448 43.8 0.98Franklin I 32
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2.4.ProposedScenarios. *e case study includes six capacity-
loss scenarios, along with base scenario without capacity
loss. *ese scenarios, namely, Scenarios 1 to 6, simulate
hypothetical power loss of six NTAs : East Village, West
Village, Soho-TriBeCa-Civic Center-Little Italy, Battery Park
City-Lower Manhattan, Chinatown, and Lower East Side,
respectively. Study area is shown in Figure 6. In each sce-
nario, during the hurricane evacuation process, power loss is
assumed to occur in one of these NTAs and it is assumed to
cause failures of all signals in the respective NTA.*e length
of all power-loss scenarios is assumed to be 12 hours, from
midday to midnight.
For all scenarios, the same travel demands are applied
using the same methodology proposed in previous research
2, where the evacuation demand is identified by calculating
the evacuation population in each census tract, then
Figure 5: Pseudocode of prediction and assignment of capacity loss.
Table 4: Modeling parameters.
Intersection Lanes Conflicts fclass Capacity
Broadway and Canal Street
4 2 14 866
3 2 14 639
3 2 14 652
Center Street and Hester Street 3 1 16 12501 1 17 379
Lafayette Street and Walker Street 2 1 14 8891 1 16 443
Broadway and Franklin Street 2 1 14 8931 1 16 448
Church Street and Walker Street 3 1 16 12581 1 16 438
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combining them to generate evacuation O-Dmatrix in terms
of TAZs (traffic analysis zone used in the planning model).
*en, the evacuation traffic is split into hours using evac-
uation response curve. *e curve is estimated using traffic
counts from Transportation Operations Coordination
Committee (TRANSCOM). Because evacuation only takes
small proportion of total traffic demand, background traffic
is calculated using the empirical trip table and excluding the
trips towards vulnerable zones. *e hourly traffic demand is
the sum of evacuation and background demand. *e sim-
plified demand modeling approach is depicted in Figure 7.
By comparing the network performance, the severity of
cascading failures can be evaluated. *e evaluation considered
metrics related to OD travel time, speed, and volume during
the study periods among neighborhoods, and the base-case
scenario with no signal failures. *e comparative results
provide some insights into the resilience of the neighborhoods.
3. Results
*e simulation was implemented through the NYBPM
models, and the results in terms of the changes in travel
times based on TAZs are shown in Figure 8. Travel times
after the power loss are compared with the travel times in the
base scenario, i.e., travel times without any capacity losses.
*e average travel time of each TAZ is calculated using travel
times of all the trips leaving a specific TAZ whose desti-
nations are within Manhattan. Longer interborough trips
were eliminated for the sake of avoiding bias.
It can be shown that in all six scenarios, signal failures
lead to an increase of travel times of the neighborhood, such
impacts which are alleviated for further zones. For Scenario
1 (East Village) and Scenario 2 (West Village), travel times
for TAZs within these NTAs are increased by 20% and less
than 10% percent for other surrounding TAZs. For Scenario
3 of Soho-TriBeCa-Civil Center-Little Italy (STCL), travel
times are increased by 20% to 30%. For Scenario 4 (Battery
Park City-Lower Manhattan), the travel times are more than
doubled in the southern tip of Financial District. Moderate
increase of travel times is observed in a small number of
TAZs within Scenario 5 (Chinatown) and Scenario 6 (Lower
East Side), and its impact is negligible for surrounding
neighborhoods compared to other scenarios.
Figure 9 visualizes the changes in link volumes compared
to the based scenario, together with Figure 10 comparing
differences of link speeds. It can be found that the 12-hour
N
Figure 6: *e study area.
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volumes of roads within power-loss areas are reduced sig-
nificantly, as shown in the green links for each scenario. *e
excessive traffic is diverted to the neighboring areas and
causes different extents of volume increase. For Scenarios 1
and 2, although the volume and speed changes within power-
loss zones are observable, the signal failures do not have a
strong impact on neighboring zones. For Scenario 3, however,
the capacity loss of STCL area diverts a considerable amount
of traffic to Chinatown and Lower East Side and deteriorates
the performance of nearly the entire network.*is is probably
because the critical corridors within STCL, such as Canal
Street and the Holland Tunnel, are disrupted, causing con-
gestion. Compared with Scenario 3, impact area of Scenario 4
is not as significant, but a significant amount of performance
reduction is observed, especially the amount of traffic diverted
to Chinatown. *is should be attributed to degraded oper-
ation of the Battery Tunnel, and traffic is diverted to nearby
Brooklyn and Manhattan Bridges with entrances located in
Chinatown. *is can also explain the network-level speed
reduction in Scenario 5. For Scenario 6, the impact of signal
loss is not significant and only the links near theWilliamsburg
Bridge are primarily affected.
Apart from measures of average performance, the var-
iation of travel times within the study periods is evaluated for
each neighborhood, as displayed in Figure 11. For all six
capacity-loss scenarios, the travel times are higher than the
base scenario. Such differences are higher in the first hours of
evacuation period and become lower with reduction of travel
demands. It can be observed that Scenario 3 causes the most




Power loss Difference of travel times
1% 5% 15% 30%
Figure 8: Changes in average travel times by TAZs. (a) Scenario 1: East Village. (b) Scenario 2: West Village. (c) Scenario 3: SoHo-TriBeCa-



















Figure 7: Demand modeling flowchart.












Figure 9: Changes in link volumes. (a) Scenario 1. (b) Scenario 2. (c) Scenario 3. (d) Scenario 4. (e) Scenario 5. (f ) Scenario 6.
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For Scenarios 4 and 6, the capacity loss affects its own
neighborhood rather than neighboring zones. *e impacts
of Scenarios 1, 2, and 5 on the network are close and also
follow the temporal patterns. *e impact of Scenario 6 is the
lowest.*ese results are in agreement with the other findings
above.
*e results above show that when the signal failures
happen in STCL, southern tip of Battery Park, and the
eastmost of TAZs in Lower East Sides neighborhood, they
lead to considerable degrading of roadway performance.
*is result implies that if the signal failure occurred next to
major roadway links used for evacuation, such as entrances
of critical bridges and tunnels, then their capacity will be
reduced significantly. *is is due to the large traffic demand
and missing of signal controls for major intersections lo-
cated in these areas. *ese results provide an insight into the
prehurricane resilience for different neighborhoods located
in lowerManhattan, which can be used to infer that roadway
systems in the East Village, West Village, and Lower East
Side are more resilient and can maintain a more stable level
of service compared to neighborhoods such as STCL and
Battery Park during evacuation under signal failures.
4. Conclusions
*is paper discussed the cascading failures of signal systems
due to the failure of power-supply infrastructure. Based on
the existing literature and common practice, signalized
intersections losing power were treated as AWSC. Differ-
ences in intersection capacity are modeled and calibrated
based on the results obtained from microscopic intersection
models.
A scenario-based macroscopic model was built to sim-
ulate its impacts on the transportation network and evac-
uation process. Six evacuation scenarios with the same
evacuation demand and signal failures at different locations
were built. Besides, spatial-temporal patterns of zonal and
link performances were evaluated. It can be concluded that
the impact of signal failures can have a strong influence on
evacuation efficiency for both the area where power is lost
and its surrounding areas. Also, the significance of the
impact is related to the intensity of evacuation demand,
density of traffic signals, adjacency to the major roadway
links, and interconnectivity to neighboring zones.
*e model proposed in this approach can provide insight
for government agencies and planners of transportation system
resilience. For example, the model can show the vulnerable
intersection or roadway segments and evaluate the impact of
signal failures during the evacuation process, so the govern-
ment agencies can locate the priority area when taking actions
to guarantee the traffic operation. In addition, considering the
different levels of resilience, the model can help the decision
makers to identify the evacuation destinations and routes in



































































Battery park city-lower manhattan
Chinatown
Lower east side
Figure 11: Variation of travel times for neighborhoods. (a) Scenario 1. (b) Scenario 2. (c) Scenario 3. (d) Scenario 4. (e) Scenario 5.
(f ) Scenario 6.
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In future study, the proposed unsignalized capacity-
loss model can be improved by conducting SUMO ana-
lyses using additional combinations of physical geome-
tries and mixed traffic conditions. Besides traffic signals,
the cascading failures of the power system can also include
malfunction of the public transit system, particularly
subway systems. Another possible direction is to evaluate
additional demands diverted from public transit to the
road network due to the suspension of the subway
network.
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